**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

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22 April 1969
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. A. MYRDAL (Sweden)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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| Brazil: | Mr. S.A. FRAZAO |
| | Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA |
| | Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA |
| | Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO |
| Bulgaria: | Mr. K. CHRISTOV |
| | Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV |
| | Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV |
| Burma: | U KYAW MIN |
| Canada: | Mr. G. IGNATIEFF |
| | Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL |
| | Mr. J.R. MORDEN |
| Czechoslovakia: | Mr. T. LAHODA |
| | Mr. V. VAJNAR |
| | Mr. V. SAFAR |
| | Mr. J. STRUCKA |
| Ethiopia: | Mr. A. ZELLEKE |
| India: | Mr. M.A. HUSAIN |
| | Mr. N. KRISHNAN |
| | Mr. K.P. JAIN |
| Italy: | Mr. R. CARACCIOLO |
| | Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI |
| | Mr. R. BORSARELLI |
| | Mr. U. PESTALOZZA |
| Mexico: | Miss E. AGUIRRE |
| | Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ |
| Nigeria: | Alhaji SULE KOLO |
| | Mr. C.O. HOLLIST |
| | Mr. L.A. MALIKI |

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| Poland: | Mr. H. JAROSZEK |
| | Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI |
| | Mr. H. STEPOSZ |
| | Mr. R. WIAZLO |
| Romania: | Mr. N. ECOBESCO |
| | Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO |
| | Mr. V. TARZIORU |
| Sweden: | Mrs. A. MYRDAL |
| | Mr. A. EDELSTAM |
| | Mr. O. DAHLEN |
| | Mr. T. WULFF |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: | Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN |
| | Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY |
| | Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV |
| | Mr. N.S. KISHILOV |
| United Arab Republic: | Mr. H. KHALLAF |
| | Mr. O. SIRRY |
| | Mr. E.S. El REEDY |
| | Mr. Y. RIZK |
| United Kingdom: | Mr. I.F. PORTER |
| | Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY |
| | Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE |
| | Mr. M.E. HOWELL |
| United States of America: | Mr. A.S. FISHER |
| | Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN |
| | Mr. W. GIVAN |
| | Mr. R.L. McCORMACK |
| Special Representative of the Secretary-General | Mr. D. PROTITCH |
| Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General | Mr. W. EPSTEIN |

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 405th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling on the first speaker I have another duty to perform. You are all aware of the sad news of the death on 17 April of Mr. Emilo Arenales, President of the General Assembly and Foreign Minister of Guatemala. Mr. Arenales, who was stricken during the course of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in New York last Autumn, carried on with great courage and outstanding competence despite the very serious operation he had undergone. Unfortunately, his malady was beyond the aid of medical science and Mr. Arenales' untimely death came when he was only 46 years of age.

3. I would ask the members of the Committee to rise and observe one minute's silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Arenales.

The representatives, standing, observed one minute's silence.

4. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I am sure I am expressing the wish of all members of the Committee in asking Mr. Protitch to request the Secretary-General to convey to the family of Mr. Arenales our deep sense of loss and our sincere condolences.

5. I now call on the first speaker, the representative of Brazil.

6. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): "Hope", said Sir Francis Bacon, "is a good breakfast, but it is a poor supper". In this fantastic, sometimes promising but so often dreadful world we are living in, I wonder when we shall be entitled to our morning hopefulness again and not be haunted by the graphic images of the modern apocalypse.

7. The menace of destruction no longer comes under the disguises of old metaphors; it is compacted in so many abbreviations, in coupled initials, which spring almost every day out of the morning papers: IRBM, ICBM, ABM, FOBS, MIRV, ULMS, SABMIS, SS-9 -- and what next? Every morning they seem to take root in our lives and to cast a shadow over our existence, the shadow of the nuclear mushroom. What shall we see tomorrow, what other sentences of potential death and destruction shall we have as a substitute for our early morning expectations? And what for supper? Should we have for supper other abbreviations in different languages, which, because they are different, are still more impressive? Certainly if they were to be served to us at our late meal, evenings and nights would be nothing more than a tragic follow-through of what sometimes appear to be the hopeless mornings of the atomic age.

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

8. In our hands lies the tenuous promise of man's secular redemption in this last quarter of the twentieth century. Naturally we are not abstract sociologists, nor philosophers, nor academic political theorists, but primarily representatives of governments, spokesmen for national interests. We are bound by the limits of pragmatism, of political realities; we -- the members of this Committee -- are also serving several and sometimes conflicting doctrines. But in order to serve them better -- or may I correct myself and say: to serve them, period -- should it not be our first pragmatic, realistic endeavour to preserve from destruction the stage and the actors, that is, earth and mankind, so that the age-old game of national interests may go on? Thus, are we not entrusted with a responsibility towards the community of nations, and are we not supposed to find the point of equilibrium where national security and world security may stand together?

9. Disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, at the stage of potential total annihilation which unfortunately we have reached, means nothing more than that -- a decision, a common decision, to avoid that "le combat soit terminé, faute de combattants". That is why, at the outset of my first intervention in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I dare express the deep conviction of my Government that this Committee faces a crucial moment. Shall we or shall we not respond to the summons of the United Nations? Can we or can we not give to the universal common man a new expectancy, a new hope, however dim, that he will not be destroyed by accident, by a strategic miscalculation or by unbridled warfare?

10. After more than seven years of continuous striving, with incipient results which barely alleviate a pervading sentiment of frustration, we might say that we have come to a crossroads. The first alternative is to embark on the set of decisions that are expected of us -- containment of the arms race and concrete measures of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. The second alternative would be to let the arms race go on unchecked and by proceeding along this devious road to come soon, perhaps too soon, to a point of no return in the spiral of atomic escalation.

11. In spite of this crude appreciation of some negative aspects of current international life we still think that with a minimum of political good will we shall be able to reverse trends and open up brighter horizons for future generations.

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

12. The evolution of the international situation in the past few years has revealed, a persistent trend, despite occasional drawbacks, towards the establishment of certain areas of understanding between the super-Powers encompassing not only the solution of political and strategic questions but also the regulation of new fields of human activity opened up by recent major advances in science and technology. However, this improving climate has not been reflected in a positive way in the negotiations on disarmament. Quite the contrary: the nuclear Powers channel ever-increasing resources to the development and refinement of new weapons systems, thereby accelerating the arms race and jeopardizing international peace and security. Meanwhile the appeals embodied in several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly go unheeded. No resources have been freed through disarmament measures to be applied in the improvement of the economic and social conditions of developing countries, which is a fundamental challenge confronting the international community in our time.

13. Some of my colleagues who have already taken the floor have given us a rather optimistic view of the work performed in the field of disarmament. The representative of the United States, Ambassador Gerard Smith, mentioned the "limited but still highly significant successes" (ENDC/PV.397, para. 11) already achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Others, such as the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and you, Madam Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Sweden, have depicted in sombre tones the present situation regarding arms control and arms escalation. I venture to say that there is truth in both views.

14. The mere fact that we are sitting around this table and debating such vital issues, which affect individual sovereign States as well as the world community as a whole, is already a reason for comfort and encouragement. In the history of international relations very few instances, if any, could be found of so many questions relevant to national and collective security being debated so earnestly. Questions that in the past lay within the province of a few States are today a matter of concern to the whole community of nations and fall under the jurisdiction of its institutional bodies. This is the reflection of the growing interdependence of nations.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

15. Fully aware of this new reality we submit again that while basically representing the interests and views of our respective countries we also represent the common and fundamental interests of mankind. Because we are dealing with a subject that has a decisive bearing on the world community it is only natural for us to press for agreements that meet its legitimate expectations.

16. The ultimate goal of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, general and complete disarmament under effective international control, is a deep-rooted aspiration of mankind. Towards this objective less meaningful progress has been made.

17. Having in mind the broad framework of general and complete disarmament, it is imperative at this juncture that the attention of our Committee be focused on the negotiation of effective measures of nuclear disarmament. The concern of the international community over the meagre results so far achieved in this field finds eloquent expression both in the final document (A/7277) unanimously adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and in the pertinent General Assembly resolution (2454 B (XXIII); ENDC/237) requesting the negotiation as a matter of priority of agreements on nuclear disarmament. At this stage therefore the emphasis should be on the adoption of measures for the cessation and subsequent reversal of the nuclear arms race.

18. The vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the last decade has developed so rapidly, sometimes even abruptly, that, in spite of the strenuous efforts made here, all progress accomplished in the same period becomes overshadowed, as if at every step forward we were to be confronted by a more distant and vanishing goal. Some achievements can be counted in the field of arms control, but unfortunately they have not yet proved sufficient to quiet our concern. Among those achievements, may I be permitted to refer to what is being accomplished by the Latin-American States. Positive and far-reaching action has been taken to abolish the possibilities of the existence of nuclear weapons in a large, populated area of the world without hindering in any way the full development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This is for us a matter of pride and relief and we are persuaded of the desirability of establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones provided that regional, political and security conditions are considered adequate by the parties concerned. The political will to arrive at such positive results demonstrated by Latin-American countries is the

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

essential element that should prevail also in the course of our discussions and should lead to a world liberated from suspicion, insecurity and fear.

19. There is no denying that as long as the nuclear arms race remains unchecked and nuclear capabilities of an overwhelming nature are available no significant progress can be claimed in arms control or disarmament negotiations. Unless this question of nuclear disarmament is properly stressed it will be impossible to achieve greater international security, to say nothing of approaching the goal of general and complete disarmament.

20. In the light of those considerations the Brazilian delegation will comment on some of the specific measures which are the object of our attention at the present session of the Committee and which would have the merit of at least progressively slowing down the nuclear arms race and contributing to bringing it to a halt.

21. The freezing of the production of fissionable materials for weapons use has been the subject of our deliberations practically since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. To be accurate, it cannot be said that this cut-off will, by itself, lead to a substantial decrease in the destructive potential of nuclear arsenals, at least in the short term, in view of the hugh stocks of fissionable material held by nuclear-weapon Powers. But it may legitimately be called a step in the right direction since it would certainly curtail the possibilities of further deployment of nuclear weapons. Being a measure that does not have an erratic effect on the present strategic balance, the cut-off of fissionable material may be considered viable. Being a measure that effectively contributes to checking the nuclear arms race, it may be deemed desirable. This double characterization provides the basis for classifying this matter as an area where serious debate can be geared towards the achievement of concrete agreement, given the indispensable political will.

22. Important new developments have emerged in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which open new prospects for progress. We think the situation is ripe and we are hopeful that the freezing of the production of fissionable material for military purposes will soon become a reality. In this connexion the Committee should bear in mind resolution J of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/7277), which requested the nuclear-weapon States to channel to a fund for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon countries the special fissionable materials released as a result of the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

23. A second measure that deserves prompt consideration and action is the total banning of tests with nuclear weapons. Since the signing of the Moscow Treaty on a partial test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1), there has been a wide range of appeals, recommendations and resolutions calling for the ultimate suspension of experimental nuclear weapons explosions, but so far no effective action has been taken in this field. The main purpose of a comprehensive test ban is perfectly clear -- to prevent further sophistication of nuclear weapons and thereby to put an effective halt to the present arms race. At this juncture, when new generations of offensive and defensive weapons are beginning to take shape, with the indispensable testing of new weapon explosives, it would be senseless to permit the continued waste of immense resources and to risk the possibility of an imbalance in the strategic equilibrium.

24. The Brazilian delegation has always supported the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments and believes that nuclear devices should be used for only peaceful purposes, without any discrimination, bearing in mind the importance of such devices for the gigantic task of accelerating the progress of the developing countries. Our views on the matter are well known to members of this Committee.

25. As we have heard here, the intricate question of controls still appears today, as it has appeared for many years, to be the main difficulty in the path of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon underground tests. With almost these same words the Brazilian delegation, as long ago as 24 March 1964, in a statement made by Ambassador Araujo Castro (ENDC/PV.177, p.9), introduced a suggestion aimed at gradually banning such tests above decreasing thresholds. Available evidence indicates that recent advances in the field of seismological detection have contributed to offering new answers to this problem which in the very near future may lead to the adoption of generally acceptable formulae. The Brazilian delegation is keenly aware of the necessity of exploring all openings and of avoiding a premature handening of positions before alternative solutions are fully discussed and carefully pondered.

26. We welcome the initiative of the Swedish delegation in submitting a working paper (ENDC/242) which represents a serious effort to meet the recommendation of General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII) (ENDC/237). This proposal for the implementation of a most urgently required measure of nuclear disarmament certainly deserves our general appreciation, and should be pondered carefully by the nuclear Powers themselves.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

27. I now turn to the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, in consonance with the already universally accepted principle of the peaceful uses of these zones. Thus we believe that the question of the limits of applicability of this prohibition should be disentangled from the more complex question of ascertaining the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction. A uniform set of criteria should be adopted which does not involve classifying a specific geographical zone as inside or outside national jurisdiction but ascertains solely whether it falls or does not fall within the boundaries prescribed for the purposes of a treaty on demilitarization.

28. Any other solution might delay unnecessarily an effective agreement to ban weapons from the bottom of the oceans and would overlap with negotiations which are under way in the United Nations Committee, set up for that purpose and which cover ground beyond the military field itself. In adopting such a solution one important and particular problem would be solved without establishing any precedent whatsoever for the definition of the limits of national jurisdiction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

29. Another relevant aspect of the problem is the scope of the prohibition. Regarding this aspect we favour, in principle, an agreement that would fully exclude the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the reach of the arms race. We think, however, that a ban on weapons of mass destruction could be a preliminary measure to be achieved immediately, and a step in the right direction, while full demilitarization is being considered in the light of underlying strategic assessments.

30. Finally, there is the question of the controlling mechanisms for that agreement. We believe that that question involves some difficult technical problems that deserve careful consideration. It might be that a purely reciprocal system of verification would create practical difficulties, for not all States would be in a position to exercise a thorough inspection of under-water installations. We would welcome further examination of all suggestions put forward with a view to formulating an effective and viable system of control.

31. We consider the draft treaty presented by the delegation of the Soviet Union and contained in document ENDC/240 to be an important and timely contribution to our deliberations in this Committee. We also heard with interest the views expressed on this matter by the delegation of the United States, as well as by other delegations that have commented on this problem.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

32. Other questions -- such as the reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of offensive and defensive missiles -- should also be given adequate consideration although it seems that no relevant results can be expected before bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America get under way. It would, of course, be superflous to restate the great expectations that we place in those forthcoming talks.

33. Before concluding may I be allowed to make a few general and preliminary remarks on the question of the methods of work of the Committee. We are sensitive to some suggestions made here to expedite the conduct of our deliberations. The Brazilian delegation will approach with an open mind and in a constructive spirit specific proposals aimed at enabling the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discharge in a more effective manner the mandate entrusted to it.

34. We have accumulated in this Conference a considerable number of proposals, suggestions and ideas. Some of them depend upon our determination in order to be turned into effective measures of disarmament and arms control which can provide us with real security and not the "precarious security" referred to by the Brazilian Foreign Minister in his opening statement to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the security of peoples "contingent upon the existence of arsenals that daily increase in their sophistication". (A/PV.1677, provisional, p.6)

35. I hope in due course to speak in more detail on some of the specific items on our agenda.

36. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) During the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament many of the delegations that have spoken have stressed the need to make further efforts aimed at reaching agreement on questions of general and complete disarmament. This has been mentioned by the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, Romania, Ethiopia, India and other States. At today's meeting the representative of Brazil has also touched upon questions of general and complete disarmament. A similar wish was also expressed by many countries at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly.

37. The Soviet delegation shares the concern of the representatives who have stressed the urgent nature of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The situation that has come about in the world urgently calls for the solution of that problem. The

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

continuing arms race increases from year to year the risk of a world conflict, and the possible consequences of such a conflict, because of the accumulation of armaments, become each year ever more dangerous for humanity.

38. Speaking of the arms race, we cannot but note that it is a consequence of the military policies of some Western Powers. Influential circles in those countries are staking not on disarmament but on the arms race. The military bloc of the Western Powers, NATO, has become the most important factor in the arms race and in the constant aggravation of international tension.

39. The statement of the Soviet Government on this subject published on 10 April 1969 points out that:

> "The arms race imposed on the world by the North Atlantic Alliance is being spurred on by long-term programmes for the development of new and ever more costly and destructive types of weapons, which are being elaborated both jointly and individually by the members of NATO. That is one of the main reasons why vitally important questions of disarmament have not yet been solved."

40. The leading role played by NATO in the arms race is confirmed, in particular, by data concerning the military expenditures of the member countries of that bloc. According to information published in a report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency those military expenditures are increasing much faster than the military expenditures of other countries of the world. During three years alone (1965-1967) they increased by 35 per cent. In 1966 the military expenditure of the NATO countries amounted to 53.9 per cent of the over-all world expenditure for military purposes. Thus the 14 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a population of about 500 million, are spending for military purposes more than all the other countries in the world, with a population of over 2,500 million. Since NATO has been in existence the States members of that organization have spent approximately $1,300,000 million. In the light of those figures it is impossible not to agree with the statements of those representatives who have emphasized, both at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly and at meetings of our Committee, the need to give a new impetus to negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

41. The Soviet delegation shares that point of view. In the memorandum of the Government of the USSR on disarmament of 1 July 1968 it is stated that:

" ... the Soviet Government draws attention to the need for making every effort to achieve concrete results in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give a new impetus to the negotiations on this question in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament." (ENDC/227, p.5)

42. At the same time we cannot agree with the view expressed by some representatives that the discussion by the Committee of partial disarmament measures has pushed into the background the problem of general and complete disarmament. May I remind you that the discussion of partial disarmament measures in our Committee began in July 1965, after the Committee had attempted to find an over-all solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union, which raised the problem of general and complete disarmament as long ago as 1922 at the Genoa Conference, has endeavoured to contribute in every way to an over-all solution of the problem. To that end, in 1962 it submitted for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a detailed draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1). This draft treaty provides for a broad programme of gradual disarmament, in three stages, covering the reduction and the subsequent elimination of armaments, the disbanding of all armed forces, the dismantling of foreign military bases on alien territory, the abolition of military conscription and other measures to ensure general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

43. However, at that time endeavours to find an over-all, comprehensive solution to the problem through stage-by-stage implementation of a disarmament programme met with the opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom. Under various pretexts the Western Powers either evaded discussing the substance of the disarmament problem or put forward proposals which were manifestly unacceptable to many countries. Thus, for example, a proposal was made to establish a system of control which would have been tantamount not to control over the implementation of the disarmament measures but to control over the levels of armaments and the state and fighting capacity of the armed forces of States.

44. In those circumstances it was decided to try another approach, namely, to attempt to reach agreement on those measures which were of the most urgent nature or on those

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

in respect of which the points of view of the parties were closer. In putting forward the problem of accomplishing individual collateral disarmament measures, the Soviet Government based itself on the principle that they should eventually lead to general and complete disarmament. The memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for the further reduction of international tension and the limitation of the arms race, which was issued on 7 December 1964 (A/5827*), proposed a whole range of measures, many of which were similar to the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. In that memorandum it was stated in particular that the first steps in the field of disarmament, such as the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the agreement not to place nuclear weapons in orbit.

> " ... should be followed by further agreements limiting the arms race more and more strictly, extending the area of international trust and thus clearing the way for the conclusion of an agreement on the fundamental question, namely, general and complete disarmament." (A/5827*, para. 2)

45. The fact that an organic link exists between partial disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament as the ultimate aim of our efforts is particularly illustrated by the following example. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control contained proposals to prohibit the placing in orbit or the stationing in outer space of special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (article 14), and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons (article 16). Those proposals have already become or are becoming norms of international law as embodied in article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*)).

46. We believe that the significance of partial disarmament measures is determined by the extent to which they contribute to curbing the arms race, to normalizing the international situation and to achieving our ultimate goal, which is general and complete disarmament. It is precisely on the basis of this premise that article VI has been inserted in the non-proliferation Treaty, which says:

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Thus, consideration of and agreement on collateral disarmament measures can by no means hamper the continuation and intensification of our efforts to reach agreement on problems of general and complete disarmament; on the contrary, such measures are designed to lead us towards that goal.

47. In view of those considerations, the Soviet delegation deems that the time has come to give a more concrete shape to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. That is required by the interests of maintaining and consolidating peace and is called for in General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII) (ENDC/237).

48. The need to intensify efforts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament follows logically from the whole preceding course of the discussions on disarmament problems. Many representatives who have spoken here have noted quite pertinently that the cause of disarmament is entering a new and advanced stage. This stage is characterized above all by the fact that the slogan of disarmament which had long been regarded sceptically by some statesmen as a noble but unrealistic wish has now found expression in international agreements, and this opens up good prospects for the solution of other urgent problems of disarmament, including the main problem, that of general and complete disarmament.

49. In proposing that a new impetus be given to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament we are not faced with the need to start all over again, metaphorically speaking, from zero. We have a point of departure for such negotiations the aforementioned Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. This draft treaty, worked out in full detail, is a good basis for fruitful discussions.

50. I should like to note also that as a result of the exchange of opinions in the period 1962 to 1964, we succeeded in reaching agreement in our Committee on the principles and order of consideration of disarmament problems. The joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5) circulated as a Committee document in March 1962 clearly defined the aims of negotiations, the scope and content of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the principle of implementation of disarmament by stages and the criteria for transition from one stage to the next, the principle of balanced implementation of disarmament and the principle of the necessity of strict and effective international control.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

51. It is pertinent to note that from 1962 to 1964 certain work was also carried out which resulted in a number of agreed articles of a disarmament treaty. Working drafts of the preamble (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1), articles 1, 2 and 3 (ENDC/40/Rev.1) and article 4 (ENDC/55) of the treaty were elaborated. As the members of our Committee are aware, those working drafts recorded the positions of the parties, which differed on many points but at the same time were close or even identical on a considerable number of specific formulations. Thus there exists a number of documents which can be used as a point of departure for further discussion.

52. The experience of international negotiations on disarmament accumulated during those years and the agreement which was reached on some partial disarmament measures and which has now been given expression in international treaties enable us to hope that also in questions of general and complete disarmament we can continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions by utilizing everything positive that has been done so far.

53. Noteworthy in this connexion is the proposal made by the Chairman of today's meeting, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in the First Committee at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1609, provisional, pp. 62 and 63-65) and subsequently reiterated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/PV.397, para. 95) regarding the study of the possibility of co-ordinating the measures which had previously been proposed for implementation during the first stage of disarmament and which have not yet become the subject of agreement. We believe that this proposal deserves careful study. The approach to the disarmament problem on which this proposal is based, has much in common with the proposals in the Soviet Government's memorandum on disarmament (ENDC/227) of 1 July 1968.

54. The members of our Committee will recall that the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, including rockets -- except for a certain number of intercontinental missiles -- and of aircraft, warships and artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons. It also provided for the simultaneous dismantling of military bases in foreign territories, which are the source of military conflicts. Thus already in the first stage of our programme for general and complete disarmament the implementation of measures for the elimination of

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and for the dismantling of military bases would enable States appreciably to reduce and virtually to preclude the possibility of one country attacking another with the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

55. Since the Western Powers have not agreed to the implementation of this programme, we now propose that this problem be solved in parts, beginning with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the limitation and subsequent reduction of the means of delivery of strategic weapons, the prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the limitation of navigation zones for missile-carrying submarines and the liquidation of foreign military bases. It is obvious that these proposals are also designed to limit or preclude completely the possibility of a nuclear attack by one country against another. The accomplishment of these measures would not only be a substantial step forward in solving specific questions of disarmament but would also help to create an international atmosphere favourable to further disarmament negotiations.

56. It is clear from what I have said that the measures provided for in the first stage of disarmament under the Soviet draft treaty and the proposals set out in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 are aimed at one and the same goal. The only difference is that of approach. In one case these measures are proposed as the first stage of an over-all programme of disarmament by stages, whereas in the second case they are proposed as individual measures designed to open the way to general and complete disarmament.

57. The Soviet Union is prepared to take either of those roads and to solve the problem of disarmament in an over-all manner, by stages, or again in parts, through the implementation of partial measures. Moreover, we are prepared to discuss the aforesaid measures and ways to reach agreement on their implementation either separately or in regard to the whole set of measures simultaneously.

58. We should like to note also that discussions will be fruitful only if all the parties concerned show readiness to reach agreement. During the negotiations on general and complete disarmament which took place from 1962 to 1964 the Soviet Union was invariably guided by the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions which would meet the interests of peace and safeguard the security of the peoples, and it repeatedly went half-way to meet its partners in the negotiations. Thus, in an attempt to help bring the positions closer together, the Soviet Union altered its original proposals concerning the time limits for the implementation of disarmament, the levels of armed forces, the scale of reduction of conventional armaments, and so on.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

59. In view of the apprehensions expressed by the United States and some other Western Powers concerning the simultaneous elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament, as proposed in its original draft treaty, the Soviet Union proposed the so-called nuclear missile "umbrella" (A/PV.1127, paras. 76-77). We proposed that, until the end of the third and last stage of complete disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union should retain a strictly limited number of delivery vehicles with nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union also expressed its willingness to accept a number of measures proposed by the United States for diminishing the danger of war in the first stage of disarmament. However, the steps proposed and taken by the Soviet Union in order to find mutually acceptable solutions met with no response on the part of the Western Powers.

60. The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced of the necessity of taking decisive steps to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The interests of mankind, the interests of future generations, urgently require us to remove the obstacles from the road leading to general and complete disarmament and, first and foremost, the main obstacle, the arms race, spurred on by certain Western countries members of NATO.

61. In its aforementioned statement of 10 April of this year the Soviet Union appealed to the countries members of the North Atlantic Alliance to put an end to the arms race and to embark on the road to disarmament. The statement says:

> "the adoption of measures aimed at implementing disarmament is increasingly urgent. The Soviet Government is firmly convinced of the necessity resolutely and steadfastly to make progress towards disarmament, whatever efforts may be required, because there are no better or more reliable ways and means of ensuring true security and lasting peace."

62. In advocating the continuation of negotiations on general and complete disarmament the Soviet delegation is convinced that if during these negotiations all the parties concerned show a constructive approach and a sincere endeavour to reach agreement on this cardinal problem of disarmament, the said problem will be solved, however complex it may be.

63. In conclusion, we should like to express the hope that the other delegations will also deem it possible to set forth in the Committee their views on these urgent questions upon which the future of mankind depends.

64. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I wish now to speak as the representative of Sweden.

The Committee has started a most interesting discussion on the item of our agenda called "the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed". (ENDC/236, p.3). As I had occasion to point out in my first intervention at this session (ENDC/PV.397, para. 101), this is in no small way due to the initiative of the delegation of the Soviet Union in having put forward at the very opening meeting of the Committee a full draft treaty text covering the subject (ENDC/240).

65. It is now incumbent on all delegations to contribute to our progress on this item by commenting on the Soviet draft. I am very glad to note that the view that I expressed earlier (ENDC/PV.397, para.102), that discussion of drafting points also in informal meetings would help prepare the way for agreement, seems to be shared by several delegations.

66. Today I want to make a more general tour d'horizon of the issue, in order to stress that progress is urgent. In the first instance it is important to grasp the opportunity to arrive at agreements, as is still possible in this case, to ban undesirable developments before they actually occur, rather than try later to restrict and eliminate them when they have become firmly entrenched. Also, this Committee will need the precious time allotted to it for several other disarmament measures of even more immediate importance for securing peace than building legal barrages against a future arms race on the sea-bed.

67. Let me first pass in review the kinds of military installations which -- as we understand it -- might be installed on the sea-bed, now or in the near future, in order to proceed thereafter to examine which of them must and can be ruled out. This should indicate the desirable scope of the prohibitory regulations of an agreement to preserve the sea-bed for peaceful purposes. Obviously, it is not possible for the representative of a small country to deal in a fully authoritative manner with this issue. Few nations possess first-hand knowledge of its technical and military background. However, an increasing flow of published material is available; an example of this is the working paper prepared last year by the United Nations Secretariat at the request of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the sea-bed -- "The military uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction" (A/AC.135/28 of 10 July 1968).

68. All authoritative writers on the subject agree that military factors are playing a vital role in the growing concern about sea-bed developments. One commentator has even stated that the total potential for war in the future will be largely determined by its undersea component. The possibility is thus foreseen of intensive deployment

(The Chairman, Sweden)

of undersea weapons and operational military craft capable of utilizing the ocean floor as a base for their activities. The military budgets of the great Powers in so far as they are published, indicate quite substantial sums for research and development connected with what is called "anti-submarine warfare" and other projects related to the sea-bed.

69. The most striking possible use of the sea-bed for military purposes -- and also probably the most dangerous one -- concerns underwater missile bases for nuclear weapons. As the super-Powers now possess good resources for surveillance of each other's land territories, through satellites, there seems to be growing concern that they might choose to try hiding missiles either above, on, or in the ocean floor. Such a base could be fitted into the floor itself or be anchored to the sea-bed. Either type would be almost impossible to detect once it had been installed. The tracking devices now being developed and deployed in order to follow the movements of submarines would, we believe, probably not be effective against such immobile bases.

70. Already today the sea-bed can be used militarily for anchoring mines. Mines can also be placed on the sea-bed. In addition to conventional types there may exist or be developed mines with nuclear explosives. Other military uses concern storing vital supplies -- for instance, fissionable material or weapons -- in "caches" in the sea-bed; communications facilities and monitoring devices; and base facilities for submarines, as well as the introduction of defence structures against various weapons. Establishments for civilian purposes, such as oil extraction units, could be combined with a military installation, such as a missile base or an observation post.

71. We are not dealing here with developments pertaining to a distant future. The technical possibilities for achieving all these projects seem to exist today. The potential realization of new developments will be dependent mainly on the underwater depth at which the various installations can be placed, for technical or economic reasons.

72. When turning from a review of possible prospects to attempts to forestall them by international action, my delegation feels strongly that the overriding principle should be to protect the sea-bed from any utilization, any installations, which could form an obstacle to the fulfilment of that grand design on the part of the international community which is to carry out -- to use the words of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII) -- the exploration and explcitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

(The Chairman, Sweden)

"... for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, taking into account the special interests and needs of the developing countries".

73. I wish also to remind members of the Committee, in this context, of the statement in the preamble to the outer space Treaty that:

"... the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific developments" (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex:)

and, quoting from article I of that Treaty, that outer space "shall be the province of all mankind".

74. The vast ocean bed certainly is the province of all mankind and is probably its last great reservoir of riches. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to be made the object of "territorial" usurpation by individual States or the theatre of a race to emplace national installations which would act as obstacles to its exploration and future exploitation for the joint benefit of all countries. A régime for such international co-operation, prohibiting also national arrogation for "peaceful purposes", is what we expect to result from the work of the sea-bed Committee; but here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee we are, of course, engaged in the primordial task of keeping the sea-bed clear of military impediments.

75. Explicit international legislation to that effect has hitherto been lacking. Some guidance may, however, be derived from the Geneva Conventions of 1958. The Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958 [1] indicates that "no State may validly purport to subject any part of /the high seas/ to its sovereignty"; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf of the same date [2] authorizes only installations for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. We must therefore prepare legislation so as to forestall the installation of military devices on the sea-bed outside the territorial waters of the coastal State, by a demilitarization agreement. That would amount to a very timely "non-armament" measure. It would have the same conflict-preventing character as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 [3] and the outer space Treaty of 1967.

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 450, pp. 82 et seq.

2/ ibid., vol. 499, pp. 311 et seq.

3/ ibid., vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

76. With those general principles in mind my delegation greeted with positive interest the draft treaty text put forward by the Soviet delegation in document ENDC/240. We have studied it with considerable care. The ensuing debate here in the Committee, as well as the preliminary exchange of views in the United Nations, has been concentrated mainly on three points demanding specification, as was underlined by the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement at our meeting of 17 April (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 22-23) and by the representative of Brazil today. They are as follows:

(a) what should be the scope of the prohibition to be arrived at or, more concretely, what weapons or military measures should be prohibited?

(b) how, in this context, should the prohibited area be delimited?

(c) how should control be arranged?

I should like to indicate in general terms the thinking -- which is, of course, provisional so far -- of my Government on those three points.

77. The prohibition must encompass all military installations. If the prohibition is not made total, any control will become unwieldy, not to say impossible. Therefore agreed definitions will be needed so as to demarcate clearly what is meant by expressions such as "for peaceful purposes" and "military installations".

78. The geographical area to be covered by the prohibition should be as large as possible. If, for instance, the parts of the continental shelves over which coastal States today claim limited national sovereignty were to be excluded from the demilitarized area, none of the seas adjacent to the coasts of my country -- neither the Baltic nor the eastern parts of the North Sea -- would be covered by the agreement but would be open to military installations, possibly directly confronting each other. The situation would be even more precarious in many parts of the world. As the very definition of what constitutes the continental shelf is open-ended, the risks of conflicts in attempts at delimitation would be endless.

79. Our conclusion is that a line should preferably be established at a fixed distance from the coastal base lines which would form the delimitation. Outside that border line, military installations on the sea-bed would be forbidden; inside it the coastal State would have free option. Unless we strive for the most clear-cut formula in this context the agreement we may ultimately arrive at will be of limited value only.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

80. To find a solution on the no less important question of control we might compare the formula used in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 with that used in the outer-space Treaty of 1967.

81. Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides that in order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the Treaty provisions, the Parties have the right to carry out inspections through designated observers. Those observers have complete freedom of access at any time to any area of Antarctica. The right of inspection includes all stations, installations and equipment within Antarctica, as well as all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time. The parties are further obliged to notify each other of all expeditions and stations within Antarctica as well as of any military personnel or equipment they intend to utilize there.

82. The corresponding provisions in the outer-space Treaty, article XII, are definitely more limited in scope. They provide that all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to other parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Before a projected visit can take place, reasonable advance notice must, however, be given and appropriate consultations be held to ensure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

83. The formula used in the Antarctic Treaty seems to us preferable as a model, but is, of course, a matter for further debate within the Committee.

84. It has been natural for our delegation to view the Soviet draft text in the light of the principles I have just outlined. I shall now proceed, therefore, to somewhat more detailed comments and to some queries following the Soviet text in document ENDC/240.

85. The preamble to a final treaty should perhaps, in addition to the paragraphs contained in the Soviet draft, reproduce some of the language used in the principal United Nations resolutions on related matters. I am thinking particularly of passages such as those I have quoted earlier and some which would bring the text more in line with the contents of the preamble to the outer-space Treaty. One formulation used in connexion with outer space, but not finally retained in the preamble to that Treaty, is: "Desiring to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field" (General Assembly resolution 1472 (XIV)). I submit this as a suitable paragraph

(The Chairman, Sweden)

in a somewhat extended preamble to the sea-bed Treaty because the avoidance of national conflicts is exactly what we want to achieve first of all.

86. It might also be useful to give reference in the preamble to some of the already existing treaties concerning the law of the sea in order to make clear that their provisions have been taken into account. I am thinking particularly of the Convention on the High Seas and its provisions concerning the freedom of the sea and safeguarding navigation and fisheries, as well as the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas. The Convention on the Continental Shelf might also be mentioned. A careful study of those and perhaps other treaties to make sure that the results of our work will not be in conflict with any of their provisions is obviously necessary.

87. To turn now to the substantive parts of the Soviet draft treaty, the delimitation contained in article 1, which suggests the figure of twelve miles -- a figure that may of course be discussed. The great virtue of the language used here lies in the choice of a definite limit, equal for all States, irrespective of present delimitation of their territorial waters or the possibilities of extending limited jurisdiction over parts of the continental shelf. For one thing, the continental shelf is unevenly distributed between various areas of the globe. The possible expansion of certain limited rights of the coastal State has, as is well known, been made dependent, in the Convention of 1958, on technical capacities. This would give States with more advanced technological methods a possibility to extend their jurisdiction considerably further than States deprived of those means.

88. The second paragraph of article 1 in the Soviet draft brings us to the main issue: what types of military uses are to be prohibited. I think we may work from the two extremes: cables on the sea-bed definitely allowed; installations containing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction definitely prohibited. We have studied with great care the statement made by the United States representative, Ambassador Smith, on 25 March 1969, in which he argued the case for prohibiting the emplacement of the latter kind of weapons only, while stating that the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed "would ... be simply unworkable and probably harmful" (ENDC/PV.397, para. 34).

89. We can, however, see no ground for accepting that reasoning. If the ultimate purpose of our endeavours is to keep the sea-bed open for international pursuits for peaceful purposes and to ensure the freedom of the seas -- which is, after all, the generally accepted aim -- the sea-bed should not be dotted with different kinds of

(The Chairman, Sweden)

installations for military purposes. If, however, there should ultimately be general acceptance of a prohibition which would be subject to a few exceptions, these would have to be clearly defined and stated in the treaty. The Antarctic and outer-space Treaties could give useful guidance, there again, as to suitable language.

90. Article 2 of the Soviet draft contains the provisions on control. Ambassador Roshchin pointed out in his statement on 3 April that:

> "Should an agreement on a comprehensive ban on military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor be concluded, the parties could apply the principle of free access to objects placed on the sea-bed in order to verify compliance with the treaty." (ENDC/PV.40C, para. 24).

91. We agree fully with that standpoint. The moment no military installations are permitted all installations and objects on the sea-bed can be inspected as they will be connected with peaceful activities only. However -- and I come back to this possible qualification -- should the final outcome of our negotiations as to the scope of the prohibition contain certain exceptions, thus allowing for the installation of some structures of a military nature on the sea-bed, it would seem necessary that a process of obligatory notification be introduced.

92. I come now to the concept of reciprocity introduced in article 2 of the Soviet draft. To us this is obscure. It might be interpreted as meaning "open to other parties which also have installations on the sea-bed". But the meaning must surely be rather "open on a non-descriminatory basis for inspection by all parties to the treaty". We should welcome clarification on this point. It is also important to recall the possibility that inspection may come to be carried out through an international undertaking.

93. How the inspection could be realized is an important question in this connexion on which it would be interesting to have the views of other delegations. Submarines might conceivably have to be used; diving-bells for the greater depths and underwater television cameras. Magnetic detectors might be useful in order to localize metal structures on the sea-bed which might then have to be identified further by any of the methods mentioned earlier or by yet other methods. As States have different capacities for participating in this form of control, some sort of international co-operation may be necessary.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

94. Article 3 of the Soviet draft is acceptable to us.

95. On article 4 I should like to make the comment that the question of the names of the future depositary Governments, left blank in the draft, is of considerable importance. It does not seem to be indicated that the three nuclear-weapon Powers should in all disarmament treaties retain the special position as depositary Governments which they have had hitherto, involving, on the construction used in the recent treaty texts as well as in this one, the veto power on their part as to the entry into force of the treaties in question.

96. In this context we think also that the number of ratifications -- that is, five -- suggested in the Soviet draft for the entry into force of the treaty is far too small. This treaty will be an important one and a greater number of ratifications should be needed to trigger off its coming into being. This would be particularly important if our final product were not comprehensive in its prohibitions. One might suggest the same number of ratifications as is prescribed in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on the law of the sea -- that is, twenty-two States. Needless to say, the adherence of such States as China and France in addition to the main Powers represented here would be particularly welcome. We might all think of ways to secure such adherence.

97. I wish to end my statement today with a further reminder of the urgency of this matter. If we fail to reach our agreement soon, an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor seems inevitable. Even if only the super-Powers could be the instigators of such a venture, all States would become involved in its consequences. In the first place it might lead to extravagant claims of sovereignty by individual States over parts of the sea-bed under international waters. Further, it would most certainly create increased international tension and might jeopardize existing and also future systems of balance of power. Finally, it would seem likely that such a race between the main Powers would not be confined to a search for military advantages but would cover economic and commercial prerogatives as well.

98. We should keep in mind the fact that the military aspects constitute only one part of the complex issue of the sea-bed. Important as is the prevention of its militarization, international regulations of its exploration and exploitation for peaceful purposes is of immediate urgency also. We all know that this aspect is the main concern of the Committee on the sea-bed set up by the General Assembly in 1968 (resolution 2467 A (XXIII)).

(The Chairman, Sweden)

However, the speedy and successful conclusion of our labours constitutes a prerequisite, I think, for the success of its endeavour to create machinery for joint international co-operation to ensure that the resources of the sea-bed will benefit mankind as a whole.

99. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (translation from French): I merely wish to make a brief statement in order to present document ENDC/245, which has been distributed by the Secretariat at our request.

100. In its statement on 25 March the Italian delegation expressed its views on our future work (ENDC/PV.397, paras. 50-84). I think I am right in saying that a number of delegations were interested in those views. Not only did the representative of Sweden (ibid. para. 95) and the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.402, para.36) refer to them in their previous statements but we seemed to detect some ideas fairly close to our own among those expounded by the representative of Romania (ENDC/PV.400, paras.75-97) and the representative of India (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 39 et seq.).

101. The comments on the subject of general and complete disarmament that we have just heard from the representative of Brazil and the representative of the Soviet Union have also reminded us of the complex and delicate problems connected with this basic task of our Committee.

102. Since our previous intervention our Committee has had the benefit of the contributions of several other delegations which, in regard to specific and very precise fields, have suggested proposals and developed particularly constructive ideas, concerning which, however, contradictory opinions have been expressed.

103. That leads us to believe that the balance of interests which is the foundation of any possible agreement and which was quite rightly called for by the representative of the United Arab Republic in his statement on 15 April (ENDC/PV.403, para.20) is all the more difficult to achieve as the search for it is limited by the necessarily narrow framework of each specific measure. To go beyond that framework in order to find that balance in an organic programme of disarmament would, on the contrary, facilitate our task. I wish to stress that that idea does not, of course, involve any element of rigidity. On the contrary, in the working paper that we are presenting we conceive it in a supple and flexible manner. The need for an organic programme therefore does not, in our opinion, exclude negotiation, and perhaps agreement, in the specific fields listed in the agenda of our work (ENDC/236, p.3) but, quite to the contrary, greatly encourages it.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

104. This necessity for an organic programme has, moreover, been felt ever since the beginning of our work in 1961 and 1962. Indeed, the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the programmes for general and complete disarmament of the two great Powers (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1 and ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1-3) date from that time. Subsequently, with a view to avoiding the difficulties which were bound to arise with plans on such a scale, another way was chosen by tackling the problem through the study of individual collateral measures.

105. It is therefore high time that we came back to the sources, that we returned to the origins of our work, which at the same time constitute the final goal. That final goal is, moreover, the only one which speaks a clear and convincing language, a language which is understood and spoken with equal fervour by the entire human race without distinction.

106. The necessary balance between the different measures of disarmament to which I have just referred meets not only a political need but also very precise requirements for technical balance.

107. All those balances -- and still others -- must be found. The aim of the Italian delegation in having its working paper circulated is to facilitate this search by opening the way to an exchange of profitable ideas.

108. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I have been asked to read the following communication from the two co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen have consulted other members about suggestions made during the informal meeting on 16 April. It was the consensus among members that additional informal as well as formal meetings can be held on Wednesdays upon the request of any delegation. If any delegation wishes to call for an informal Wednesday meeting, the co-Chairmen should be notified. It was the general feeling that the meetings might be more useful if requests were made at a reasonable time in advance.

"The co-Chairmen suggest that an informal meeting be held on 30 April to discuss the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 405th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, the USSR, Sweden and Italy.

"The delegation of Italy submitted a working paper setting forth suggestions for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme (ENDC/245).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.".

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.